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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:
An

award

of

attorney

fees would

benefit

Call,

personally, because he has realized only 1/3 of his
actual loss.

An award of attorney fees would also

benefit

attorney

United

the
States

Supreme

personally;
Court

has

however,
permitted

the
such

claims under the common fund doctrine.
POINT II:
Call has asked to join additional parties under
Rules 19 and 21.
the

class

West Jordan's response is that

certification

was

there can be no joinder.

denied;

therefore,

That argument is not

supported by any authority and is not taken in good
faith.
POINT III:
Call claims that there was never any evidence that
a public hearing was held.
marshal1 any evidence.

West Jordan does not

Rather, West Jordan simply

says that the lower court agreed.

There is no good

faith basis for West Jordan's curious argument.

POINT IV:
West Jordan's bad faith was not only exhibited in
the trial court, the bad faith has continued in the
processing of this appeal.
POINT V:
Contrary to Call's claims, the preliminary master's
report

criticizes

procedures.

West

Jordan's

accounting

Furthermore, it made no economic sense

for Call to invest

$18,400 on a final master's

report in hopes of winning $16,576.
POINT VI:
The Supreme Court mandated the trial court to ". .
. enter

judgment consistent with this opinion."

The civil rights claim is
opinion. "

Therefore,

"consistent with this

Call

was

entitled

to

a

judgment on his civil rights claim.
POINT VII:
Call's

civil

pleadings.

rights

claim

was

raised

by

the

However, it became moot when the trial

court originally ruled that a public hearing had
been held.

2

POINT I
THERE IS NOTHING EVIL ABOUT
AN ATTORNEY WHO WANTS TO BE PAID
West Jordan makes much of the fact that the attorney's

fee

issue will

benefit Call's attorney personally.

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 10, 17, 23.)
It is simply not true that an award of attorney
fees will only benefit the attorney.

The client (Call) has

already

If

paid

his

attorney's

fee.

the

Court

awards

attorney fees, the clients gets a refund; and the trial court
was so advised.
the

judgment

(September 11 Tr., at p. 3.)

(before

interest) was

In this case,

$16,576.

(R.

1977.)

However, after attorney fees and costs, Call, personally,
got only about one-third of that amount-'-.
and R. 1987.)

(Compare R. 1854

It is no wonder that Call (personally) is

interested in the attorney's fee awardOf

course,

the

attorney

would

benefit from an award of attorney fees.

also

personally

In this case, Call's

attorney earned substantially less than five dollars ($5.00)

Judgment before interest:
One-third contingent fee:
Accounting fees and Master fees:
Net:
3

$16,576.00
5,500.00
5,245.00
$ 5,831.00

per hour for his ten years of work^.
with an attorney who wants to be paid.

There is nothing wrong
The Supreme Court of

the United States has called this the common fund doctrine.
The common fund doctrine operates when a lawyer
creates, increases or preserves a fund, and other persons
benefit

from that f und^.

In such a situation, the U.S.

Supreme* Court has held that a successful plaintiff can assert
a claim for payment of legal expenses, including attorney
fees, from the common fund.
527 (1881)-

Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.

See also, Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettis,

113 U.S. 116 (1885); Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307
U.S. 161 (1939).

^Call's attorney accepted the case on a contingent fee.
(R. 1854).
As such, the attorney accepted the risk of
losing.
However, the attorney did not accept the risk of
West Jordan's bad faith which mushroomed the litigation.

J

The common fund was created when the Utah Supreme
Court declared that the 7% fees were held in trust. (Call I,
at p. 320.) Because West Jordan illegally collected the fund
(See Call III), the monies must now be returned to those who
paid into the fund.
(See cases collected at Brief of
Appellant, at p. 24.) The trouble is that, except for Call
personally, West Jordan hasn't refunded a dime to anyone.
Nor is it likely that other subdividers even know of their
rights. Therefore, the necessity to add parties under Rules
19 and 21. (See Point II below.)

4

The traditional common fund model was first set
forth in Trustees v. Greenough, supra.

In that case, Florida

had transferred millions of acres of state land to certain
trustees.

The plaintiff alleged dissipation of the assets of

the trust.

The plaintiff also alleged a collusive sale of

hundreds of thousands of acres land.
vailed.

The plaintiff pre-

In awarding attorney's fees, the Court stated:
It would be very hard on the plaintiff to
turn him away without any allowance
except the paltry sum which could be
taxed under the fee bill. It would not
only be unjust to him, but it would give
to the other parties entitled to
participate in the benefits of the fund
an unfair advantage. He has worked for
them as well as for himself; and if he
cannot be reimbursed out of the fund
itself, they ought to contribute their
due proportion of the expenses which he
has fairly incurred.
To make them a
charge upon the fund is the most
equitable way of securing such contribution.

Greenough, at 532.
Four years later, Greenough was expanded in Central
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettis, supra.

The original action was

a complaint brought in an Alabama state court to reach the
assets of the debtor, a railroad.
been framed as a class action.

The original action had

After successfully reaching

the assets of the railroad, the attorneys for the plaintiff
petitioned

for fees directly from the fund.

The Supreme

Court held in favor of the attorneys-

The court first held

that the lawyers had standing to claim a fee directly from
the fund.
When an allowance to the complainant (out
of the common fund) is proper on account
of solicitor's fees, it may be made
directly by the solicitors themselves
without
any application
by their
immediate client.
Id. at 124-25.
Next, the court concluded that the attorneys were
entitled to attorney fees.
The creditors who are entitled to the
benefit of the decree had only to await
its execution in order to receive the
full amount of their claims; and that
result was due to the skill and diligence
of the attorneys, so far as a result of
the litigation can, in any case, be
referred to the labors of counsel.
[accordingly, counsel were] entitled to
reasonable compensation for their professional services in establishing a lien,
on behalf of the unsecured creditors.
Id. at 126-27.
The third case, which establishes the basic principles of the common fund doctrine is Sprague v. Ticonic
Natl. Bank, supra, an opinion by Justice Frankfurter.

In

Sprague, the plaintiff established a trust with the defendant
bank.

The bank secured the trust with certain bonds.

security for the bonds was in dispute.

6

The

Sprague brought a

successful suit to establish her own right, (as one of the
beneficiaries) to share in the proceeds of the bonds.

Having

established her own right to share in the bond proceeds,
Sprague petitioned for reimbursement of her counsel fees to
be paid from the fund.

Unlike Greenough and Pettis, Sprague

had only indirectly established the rights of others when she
obtained a decree for her own individual relief:
When such a fund is for all practical
purposes created for the benefit of
others, the formalities of the litigation—the absence of an avowed class
suit or the creation of a fund, as it
were, through stare decisis rather than
through a decree—hardly touch the power
or equity in doing justice as between a
party and the beneficiaries of his
litigation.
Id. at 166.
Every
court^

follows

federal court and, virtually, every state
the

"common

awarding attorney's fees.

fund"

line

of

reasoning

in

See e.g., Robison v. Katz, 717

P.2d 586 (N.M. 1986); Guild, Hagen & Clark, Ltd. v. First
National Bank of Nevada, 600 P.2d 238 (Nev. 1979); Moses v.
q

The common fund doctrine has never been adopted or
rejected in Utah. The issue has simply not come up. See
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Mgt., 645 P.2d 667, 671 n.l
(Utah 1982). However, it seems likely that our Supreme Court
will follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court on
that issue. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240, 257-260 (1975).
7

McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363 (Ak. 1980); Means v. Montana Power
Co. >. 625 P.2d 32 (Mon. 1981).
In summary, Call (personally) has every right to
press for attorney fees and joinder of other parties.
attorney

(personally)

also has

every

right

Call's

to press

for

attorney fees and joinder.
POINT II
WEST JORDAN HAS MADE NO
GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT ON THE JOINDER ISSUE
Call argued that the trial court should have joined
additional parties.

(Brief of Appellant, at p. 23) 5 .

response, West Jordan makes a curious argument.

In

West Jordan

says there can be no joinder because the Supreme Court denied
class certification.

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 22.)

West Jordan completely ignored cases cited by Call
in which joinder was triggered after class certification was
denied.

Mathies v. Seymour, 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959);

Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.9
5

(1st Cir. 1964).

Rule 21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or on
its own initiative
at any time.
(Emphasis added.)

8

See also, Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F.Supp. 248 (D. Neb.
1970); and Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, 329 F.2d
909 (9th Cir. 1964)(dictum).
Likewise, West Jordan completely ignored binding
precedent from the Utah Supreme Court which requires joinder
of necessary parties at the latest possible stage of the
litigation-

Hiltsey v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1987).

Furthermore, West

Jordan

completely

ignored

the

fact that our Supreme Court declared, in this very case,
that West Jordan is holding the money of all developers in
trust (Call I, at p. 320), Finally, West Jordan has ignored
the absolute legal duty of a trustee to disgorge the trust
funds if the trust fails.

(See cases collected at Brief of

Appellant, p. 24.)
There

is

simply

no

good

faith

basis

for West

Jordan's argument that adding parties (Rules 19 and 21) is
somehow the same as a class action (Rule 23). The relationship between Rules 19, 21 and 23 is described as follows:
Interpleader, intervention, and use of
the class actions are several methods of
permissive joinder of parties, but each
has its own distinctive properties. . .
The rules regarding class actions and
permissive joinder are similar in that
before joinder or a class action is
proper, there must be common questions of
law or fact.
The rules differ, of
9

course, in that a finite number of
persons are joined under F.R.C.P. 20,
while a class action is maintainable only
if the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members of the class is impracticable.
A named plaintiff in a purported
class action may move for the joinder
under F.R.C.P. 20 of additional named
plaintiffs who would otherwise be potential class members, however, such representation is not necessary if class certification is granted, and may not be
permitted if it is prejudicial. Alternatively, if class certification is denied,
joinder of parties under F.R.C.P. 20 may
still be available. . .(Emphasis added.)
26 Fed P r o c , L.Ed. §59.148.
There

is no

showing

on this

record

that

other

developers even know about this case (or their right to a
refund).

Thus, they cannot file their own lawsuits.

If the

developers are not joined under Rules 19 and 21, West Jordan
will keep its ill-gotten gains because of the sheer luck
that the other developers don't know they were cheated.^

b

In legal terms, West Jordan's position is that a
trustee has no duty to disgorge the corpus of an illegal
trust so long as the settlors of the trust don't learn of the
illegality and make separate and independent claims.
10

POINT III
WEST JORDAN HAS NOT CITED A
SINGLE IOTA OF EVIDENCE TO SHOW A
GOOD FAITH BASIS FOR THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION
Call claims that West Jordan did not have a good
faith basis for its claims that a public hearing had been
held.

(See Brief of Appellant, at p. 19.)

It would have

been helpful if West Jordan's Brief had cited the evidence
upon which it relied to form its good faith belief.

However,

West Jordan has not cited one iota of evidence to show its
basis for any good faith belief.

Thus, this court is left in

the dark as to exactly what West Jordan's good faith basis
might have been.
Federal

court's

regularly

demand

some

factual

showing that a party has made some good faith investigation.
See e.g., Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988) 7 .
had

done

any

minimal

fact

If counsel for West Jordan

investigation,

he would

have

discovered that no public hearing had ever been held.

In

Florida Monument Builders v. All Faith's Memorial Gardens,
605 F.Supp.

1324, 1326

(S.D. Fla.

1984),

sanctions were

imposed where counsel, among other things, failed to examine
7

Thomas also holds that the trial court must
sanctions once a violation of Rule 11 is found.
11

award

pertinent

public

records

available

in the State Capitol.

Cf. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A.y Inc. v. Aero Mayflower Transit
Co, , 112 F.R.D. 664, 668 (S.D. N.Y. 1986)(counsel failed to
check

state records to see if potential

defendant was a

corporation).
Rather than presenting a factual basis to support
its

good

faith, West

argument.
because

Jordan

has

relied

upon

pure

legal

West Jordan claims that there can be no bad faith

West

Jordan

won

in

Respondent, at p. 19-20)**.
for that novel argument.

the

trial

court

(Brief

of

West Jordan cites no authority

On the contrary, there are numerous

cases which hold that an appellate court can reverse a trial
court on a Rule

11 issue.

Security Services, Inc.,

See e.g. , Thomas v. Capital

supra; Eastway Const. Corp. v. City

of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v.
C.B.S., 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

b

Specifically, West Jordan says:
In any event, the finding of the trial
court (Judge Dee) that a public hearing
had been held vitiates any and all claims
that the defendant's defense was asserted
or maintained in bad faith."

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 20.)
12

Indeed, if the trial court denies sanctions without
any justification in the record, the appellate court should
make a rigorous review,

Thomas v. Capitol Security Services,

Inc., supra, at p. 883.
It is true that Judge Dee sided with West Jordan at
trial.

However, Judge Dee's vote does not necessarily mean

that West Jordan acted in good faith.
is equally possible.

Rather, the opposite

Perhaps, West Jordan's bad faith was so

successful that Judge Dee was fooled.
It is for that reason that many Federal courts
review Rule 11 issues on a de novo basis.

See Hudson v.

Moore Business Forms, Inc., 827 F.2d 450, 452-453 (9th Cir.
1987).

Other

courts

adopt

a three-tier

approach:

The

findings of fact supporting the trial court's decision are
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard^; the legal
conclusion that the facts constitute a Rule 11 violation are
reviewed de novo; and, the amount and type of sanctions are
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d

823, 828

Zalvidar v.

(9th Cir. 1986);

Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987);
^Here the trial court made no findings.
It merely
denied the motion. Cf. Thomas v. Capital Security Savings,
supra., at p. 882-883.

13

Eastway Construction Corp, v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243,
254n.7 (2d Cir. 1985); Westmoreland v. C.B.S., supra.
This has been an enormously complex, expensive,
and protracted litigation.
fact

issue.

hearing?
remotely

Did

The
akin

West

answer

However, at bottom lies a simple
Jordan

is

that

to a public

hold
there

hearing.

the
was

required
never

public

anything

If West Jordan had

admitted that simple fact, Call could have saved years of
time and substantial attorney fees.

West Jordan should now

pay for its bad faith.
POINT IV
WEST JORDAN'S BAD FAITH CONTINUES
Call claims that West Jordan delayed this case for
several years by its frivolous claim that a public hearing
had been held1^.

(See Point III, above.)

However, the bad

faith continues throughout the post-trial motions and this
appeal.
^Actually, West Jordan switched its position on the
"public hearing" at trial. During all of the discovery, West
Jordan had relied on a meeting of January 21, 1975.
At
trial, West Jordan suddenly switched its position and relied
on the August 27, 1974 Master Plan meeting. The last second
switch in strategy violated a prior court order, and is
further evidence of West Jordan's pattern of bad faith. (R.
1179, 1851-1853.)
14

First, during the post-remand motions, Call moved
for a judgment on the civil rights claim.
above.

See Point I,

During the briefing on that issue, West Jordan relied

on the doctrine of "qualified immunity."

West Jordan relied

on the case of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S.
659

(1978).

However,

Call

has

demonstrated

that

West

Jordan's reliance on the doctrine of "qualified immunity" is
totally frivolous.

(See Exhibit A.)

Second, in the briefing of this appeal, West Jordan
again dug up the case of Monnell v. Dept. of Social Services,
supra.

This time, West Jordan argued that Monnell can not be

applied
West

retroactively.

Jordan's

frivolous.

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 16.)

retroactivity

argument

is

also

totally

See Tosti v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1485

(9th Cir. 1984).
Third,
adding

parties

in this
(Rules

appeal, West Jordan argued that

19

and

21, Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure) is the same thing as class certification (Rule 23,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
argument is totally frivolous.

(See Point II above.)

The

West Jordan cited absolutely

no authority—and, indeed, no reasoning to support the novel
argument.

15

Fourth, in this appeal, West Jordan argued that an
appellate

court

cannot

issues of bad faith.

overrule

a

trial

court

(See Point III, above.)

judge

on

Again, West

Jordan cited no authority and no reasoning to support the
novel argument.
Fifth, throughout its brief, West Jordan set forth
a

highly

biased

and

highly distorted

procedural

history.

However, West Jordan failed to make a single citation to the
record!

See Rule 24(e), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

For example, West Jordan continually argues that it never
presented

its

case-in-chief

Respondent at p. 6, 14, 19.)

at

trial.

(See

Brief

of

That is simply incorrect.

In

Call III, at p. 181, the Supreme Court stated:
Because of problems encountered by the
plaintiffs in its discovery of information in the possession of West Jordan and
because of our decision in Banberry
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City,
631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), the trial court
issued a pretrial order which placed upon
West Jordan the burden of producing
evidence on several issues. . .
(Compare Exhibit B.)
mandamus

prohibiting

The Supreme Court also issued a writ of
the trial

Jordan's case-in-chief.

court

from reopening West

(See Exhibit C ) .

16

For West Jordan to

continue, to this very day, to claim that it was prevented
from presenting evidence is egregious bad faith.
Sixth, in this appeal, West Jordan argues (without
citation to the record) that it was unfairly prevented from
arguing that Call had not paid the 7% fee under protest.
(Brief

of

Resp.

at

p.

14.)

Again, this

is a totally

frivolous argument because Call was not required to pay under
protest.
1986).

See Cox v. Utah Mtq. & Loan, 716 P. 2d 783 (Utah
Moreover, our Supreme Court ruled that the 7% fee is

not a tax.

(Call I, at p. 220-221.)

was necessary.

Therefore, no protest

See §59-2-1411, Utah Code Ann.

issue ever preserved in the pleadings.

Nor, was this

(See R. 344-346.)

In

any case, since the Utah Supreme Court ordered that judgment
be entered in favor of Call, it is far too late for West
Jordan to raise the issue of payment under protest.
Seventh,

in

this

appeal,

West

Jordan

argues

(without any citation to the record) that the Master was only
required because Call's counsel "continued to 'play dumb' by
claiming the records of the City were unintelligible to him"
(Brief of Resp. at p. 20). There was no good faith basis for
that argument.

On this issue, the Master has stated:

Since this information is not provided in
the existing accounting records, it will
have to come from other records and,
again, from the help of a trained
17

engineer. It is also possible that such
information may not be available at all
for some transactions, therefore, the
analysis would be impossible*
(Exhibit D at p. 7.)
POINT V
WEST JORDAN MISREPRESENTED THE MASTER'S REPORT
Call
accounting

asked

fees.

for

a

refund

of

master

fees

Brief of Appellant, at p. 27 1 1 .

and
West

Jordan replied that Call had waived the final master's report
(Brief

of

Respondent, at p. 21.)

West Jordan does not

explain why or how such a waiver should make any difference
as to who should pay costs.
The master's report is included at Exhibit D.

As

the court will see, the cost of the final report would have
been

$12,400

to

$18,900.

(Exhibit

D, at

p.

10.)

The

potential recovery was only $16,576 (Call I, at p. 221). It
would make little sense for Call to risk $18,900 in addition
to attorney fees for a chance to win $16,57 6. Thus, Call had
no practical alternative.
final report.

He had to waive the expensive

However, the preliminary report of the master

-'--'•The verified Memorandum
1994.
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of Costs is at R.1978 and

was used in both the trial and on appeal (R. 1231-12 32 and
Brief of Appellant, Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 19186.)
Thus,

the

preliminary

final

master's

master's

report

report
was

was
all

not
the

needed.

The

ammunition

Call

needed.
West Jordan also claims (without any citation to
the record) that, "The master found nothing wrong with the
City's records."
the master

(Brief of Respondent, at p. 21.)

criticized

West

Jordan's

records

In fact,

as being in

violation of the Uniform Municipal Fiscal Procedures Act.
(Section 10-10-29, Utah Code Ann. )
and 8.)

(See Exhibit D, at p. 7

If the records had been kept in the proper fashion,

the cost of the final master's report would have been 10 to
20% less (Exhibit D, at p. 11.)
West Jordan also argues that, "the plaintiff lost
on the master type issues."

It is true that the trial court

ruled against Call on those issues.

However, Call appealed.

On appeal, the supreme court did not reach the accounting
issues.

(Call III, at p. 181.)

This court is welcome to

review the briefs in Call III, de novo.

Such a review would

reveal that Call would have easily won the accounting issues
if the supreme court had reached those issues.

19

However, there is an easier way to reach the same
result.

The master's

necessary

to pursue

However,

that

necessary.

an

fees and the accounting
alternative

alternative

theory

theory of
should

not

fees were
recovery.H
have

been

If West Jordan had, in good faith, admitted that

no public hearing had been held; Call would not have needed
to pursue that alternate theory with its associated accounting costs.

Judgment should have been entered years ago on

the simple basis that no public hearing was held.
III, above.)

(See Point

Thus, the master's fees and the accounting fees

should be allowed under Rule 11 U.R.C.P. if not under Rule
54(d), (See Point III, above.)

J-^The first theory of recovery was simply that no public
hearing had been held. Therefore, West Jordan lacked power
to exact the fee. (See Call III, at p. 181.) No master or
accountant was necessary to present this first theory.
The second theory of recovery was that the 7% taken
from Call had no reasonable relationship to the flood control
and recreation needs created by the new subdivision.
(See
Call II.)
This theory involved substantial accounting
testimony.
The theories are overlapping.
That is to say Call
need prevail on either (but not both) of the alternative
theories to win the case. Call III found in Call's favor on
the first theory (no public hearing). Therefore, the Supreme
Court had no reason to rule on the second theory (no
reasonably relationship).

20

POINT VI
CALL'S CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM IS
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S MANDATE
Call's opening brief argued that the trial court
should

have

entered

judgment

on the civil

(Brief of Appellant, at p. 9-15.)

rights

claim.

In reply, West Jordan

cited numerous authorities for the proposition that the trial
court must strictly follow the mandate of the Supreme Court.
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 8-14.)
Call agrees.

The trial court has no power to

change or vary the mandate of the Supreme Court.

The mandate

of the Supreme Court is, ". . .to enter judgment consistent
with this opinion."
is what

judgment

Call III at p. 184. Thus, the question
or judgments

are

"consistent with

this

opinion."
It is immediately apparent that the decision in
Call III only decided a single fact issue!

The single fact

issue decided in Call III was that no public hearing was
held in connection with City Ordinance No. 33, §9-C-8(2).
Therefore, the mandate of the Supreme Court is to ". . .enter
judgment consistent with [the fact that no public hearing was
held]. "

21

The trial court granted a judgment refunding the
monies paid (R. 1976-1977),

However, there was absolutely

no basis for the trial court to single out one particular
remedy (viz. a refund) while excluding other remedies (viz.
civil rights).
Call's

civil

rights

claim

pleadings (R. 331 f at para- 38),

was

raised

by

the

Furthermore, the Supreme

Court's fact finding (viz, that no public hearing had been
held) is consistent with Call's civil rights claim.
Brief of Appellant, at p. 9-15.)
claim

is

should

(See

Since the civil rights

"consistent with this opinion," the trial court

have entered

a judgment granting relief under the

civil rights claim.
The case of -Costa v. Sunn, 697 P.2d 43 (Haw. App1985) is squarely on point.

In the first appeal 1 ^

Hawaii

that certain

Supreme

Court declared

state welfare

rules were invalid because no public hearing was held.
as in Call III.)

the

(Just

The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded with

instructions, ". . .for entry of a judgment consistent with
this opinion."

(Just as in Call III.)

Upon remand, the

trial court entered a judgment that the new welfare rules

13

Costa v. Sunn, 642 P.2d 530 (Haw. 1982).
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were invalid.
court went

(Just as in Call III.)

further.

However, the trial

The trial court reinstated

the old

welfare rules and ordered retroactive benefits to be paid
pursuant to the old rules.

The State appealed.

On the

second appeal, the State argued that the trial court had no
power under the mandate (viz. "to enter judgment consistent
with this opinion") to award affirmative relief for money
damages.

The appellate court easily disposed of the argument

by stating:

"DSSH's argument that the action of the circuit

court is not authorized by the remand is without merit."
Costa, supra at p. 47 n. 8.
In

summary,

the

mandate

was,

judgment consistent with the opinion."

"•

.

.to

enter

(Call III at p. 184.)

Since the civil rights claim is ". • .consistent with this
opinion," the trial court had no discretion.

The trial court

was bound to enter judgment on the civil rights claim.
POINT VII
CALL DID NOT WAIVE
HIS CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIM
West Jordan argues that Call's civil rights claim
was waived-^.

Specifically, West Jordan says that the civil

-^Apparently, West Jordan concedes that a civil rights
violation occurred.
West Jordan's only response is the
procedural defense of waiver; and the argument on retroactivity. (See p. 13 and 19 above.)
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rights claim was not argued to the trial court or to the
Supreme Court,

(Respondent's Brief, at p. 15.)

The only specific

fact necessary to support the

civil rights claim was that no public hearing was heldBrief of Appellant, at p. 10-15.)

(See

West Jordan had the burden

of proof to establish the fact that a public hearing had, in
fact, been held (Exhibit B at para. 2D).

The trial court

ruled that West Jordan sustained the burden:

or in other

words, the trial court ruled that a public hearing had been
held.

(R. 1496, at para. 22.)
Because of the trial court's fact finding (viz.

that a public hearing had been held) legal argument on the
civil rights claim was moot.

It was only when the Supreme

Court reversed the trial court's fact finding (viz. that no
public hearing was held) that the civil rights issue became
ripe for further consideration.
Costa v. Sunn, supra is again on point.

In Costa,

there was no argument in the first trial or on the first
appeal that the state should grant money damages under the
old welfare rules.

The only issue in the first trial and

first appeal was that the new welfare rules should be

24

nullified. However, after the Hawaii Supreme Court nullified
the new welfare rules, the trial court went further to grant
all legal relief (viz. money damages) which logically flowed
from that finding.

On appeal, the State argued that the

mandate of the Supreme Court did not permit the new issues.
The appellate court easily affirmed the lower court's action.
CONCLUSION
This case should be remanded with instructions for
the trial court to:
1.

Assess bad faith damages against West Jordan.

2.

Join all other developers who paid 7% into the

illegal fund.
3.

Enter a judgment on Call's civil rights claim.

4.

Increase the costs allowed to Call to allow

for the master's report and the accounting fees.
DATED this 30

day of

~JUv£

, 1988.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the ^ \)f)

day of

f
<-^y.

T /<nt

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS'
REPLY BRIEF, was mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing a
copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the following:
Stephen G. Homer
West Jordan City Attorney
1850 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 84084

/ek/jc
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EXHIBIT A

SEP3D

»«*

9nW8

t^Hit^

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915

BY**

•;L'J,^Y

CLEW

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CALL AND
CLARK JENKINS,

]|
|
|
]|
|
]
|
]
|
;

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT J.
DEBRY IN SUPPORT OF
ATTORNEY FEES FOR BAD
FAITH RELIANCE ON
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Civil No. C78-829
JUDGE PAT BRIAN

ss.

My name is Robert J. DeBry.

I give the

following

testimony under oath.
1.

I

2.

On

am

the

attorney

for

plaintiffs

in

this

action.
or

about

September

9,

1987,

filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Summary

Motion for

Judgment.
3.

that

defendant

the

immunity."

As a part of that memorandum, defendant

City

of

West

Jordan

was

entitled

to

argued

"qualified

Defendant relied on the case of Monell v. Dept.

of Social Services,. 436 U.S. 659

(1978).

4.

The evening before the hearing, I had retired

to bed early, and I was reviewing the briefs in preparation
for the hearing the next morning.

When I came upon the

argument regarding "qualified immunity," I realized that I
was on unfamiliar terrain.

Therefore, I got out of bed and

went to the Law School Library.
5.

I found that Monell is a very lengthy opinion

which doesn't discuss "qualified immunity" at all. However,
I was concerned that I may miss something, so I shepardized
Monell.

That review led me to Owen v. City of Independence,

445 U.S. 621, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673.
Owen

does

discuss

the

doctrine

of

immunity" as that relates to a municipality.
holds

squarely

immunity.

that

municipalities

do

"qualified

However, Owen

not

have

At 100 S.Ct. 1415, the Court holds:
In sum, we can discern no "tradition so
well grounded in history and reason"
that would warrant the conclusion that
in enacting 1 of the Civil Rights Act,
the 42d Congress sub silentio extended
to municipalities a qualified immunity
based on the good faith of their
officers. Absent any clearer indication
that Congress intended so to limit the
reach of a statute expressly designed to
provide a "broad remedy for violations
of federally protected civil rights,"
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S., at 685, 98 S.Ct. at
2033, we are unwilling to suppose that
injuries occasioned by a municipality's
unconstitutional conduct were not also
meant to be fully redressable through
its sweep.

2

such

6.

During the course of argument, West Jordan's

attorney stated:
. . .1 am not going to pat myself on the
back, but I am [familiar] with these
things because cities somehow are being
sued under civil rights, so I, as City
Attorney have to pay attention to these
things. . .
7.

Virtually all cases in our office are done on

a contingent fee, thus I have no established hourly fee.
However,

it

is

my

observation

that

senior

experienced

litigators in this community are paid $100-150 per hour.
8.

I have

spent

five

hours

(including

three

hours library time) in preparing and arguing this motion.
DATED this ^fe

day of

C^ Zt

, 1987.

^SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this

of

L^l
1

"*•

df

, 1987.

&\~7\OAM^J
NOfAR^ PUBLIC
Residing at:

ires:

f8 : PUBLIC
X*^ \ Commission expires .* r^u
\
\ Aus.27.ttB8 ..'
P

3

]~

day

EXHIBIT B

ROBERT J. DESRY 4 ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South 12
Salt LaXe City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL and CLARX JENKINS
Plaintiffs,

AMENDED
ORDER
C i v i l No. C-78-829

vs.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH,
Defendant.

Plaintiffs* Renewed Motion for Sanctions (July 29, 1982)
was heard on August 6, 1982.
Robert J. Deary.

Plaintiffs were represented by

Defendant was represented by Stephen Homer.

After considering the arguments of counsel, it is hereby ordered
that:
1*

The trial is hereby bifurcated into two phases.

2*

At the first phase, defendant shall have the burden

of producing evidence on the following issuesi
A.

Defendant to provide an accounting of the trust: fundSr

paid to defendant in the form of a 7\ subdivided a fee.

The

accounting should, intor alia, specify how defendant has spent
the 7\ subdivision fees paid by plaintiffs.

The accounting shall

also compare how defendant has spent the 1\

fees received froa tho.

other subdivisions listed in Defendant's Response to Discovery
dated May 2S, 1982, Call v. Citv of west Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 220
(Ut. 1979).
B.

j

Defendant to disclose the calculations upon which it

relics to assure that tho 7% fees are within the standard of
reasonableness.

This shall, inter alia, include the data upon

which defendant relics to show that 71 (as opposed to 10% or some
other amount) is a reasonable amount.

This shall further include

the data upon which defendant relics to show that the newly

APPENDIX "H"

14'?£

developed properties bear their equitable share of costs in
relation to benefits conferred.

Oanbcrry Oev. Corp, v. South

Jordan City, 631 P.2d 889, 904 (Ut. 1981).
C.

Whether the 7% subdivision fee was in practice used as

a reasonable charge for a specific purpose, or whether it was in
practice used as a general fee that amounts to a revenue measure.
Laffertv v. Pavson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Ut. 1982).
0.

Whether Section 9-C-8I2) of west Jordan City Ordinance

33 was prepared by the Planning and Honing Commission, and whether
a public hearing was held prior to promulgating the ordinance.
Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 219 (Ut. 1979).
3-

Plaintiffs may reserve all cross-examination on the-

foregoing issues until the second phase of the trial.
4.

After defendant has introduced its evidence, the trial

shall be recessed for a period convenient to the Court, but no
less than- thirty (30) days.

After the Court resumes session,

plaintiffs may conduct, their cross-examination of defendant*
witnesses.
5-

After plaintiffs have conducted their cross-examination

and after allowing for appropriate rc-direct and re-cross, examination^ plaintiffs shall proceed to put on their case-in-chief.
&•

This second, phase of the trial shall include the

theories listed below.

Plaintiffs shall have the burden of proof

rfith respect to each matter listed below:
A*

Whether the 7% fee required of plaintiffs had any

reasonable relationship to the nco\ls

for flood control, parxs, anc

recreation facilities created by their subdivision.

Call v. City

of west Jordan. 614 P.2d 1257, 1259 (Ut. 1979); Banberrv Oev.
Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903 (Ut. 1981).
B.

Whether the 7\

fee has required the newly developed

properties to bear more than their equitable share of capital cost
in relation to the benefits conferred.

Banberry Dev. Corp. •.

#

South Jordan Citv. 631 P.2d 903 {Ut. 1981).

1 it •*•-*

,„„ ,# so, in -hat amount.
-or failure to »a>ce discovery and. x.«,* hv the pleadings.
0. All other theori.* raised b,
, t h a i r demand for * 1*^ t-i*i.

-

—

- " • —

—

.

;

:

;

«

-

»

-

—

-

-

-~A tar -hi* reason tnat tnc p
trial is denied for .he
, _ c _ 8 m of w . t Jordan
A in this case is whether Section 9-C 8(2)
determined in this case
i n v o ive« « l w
C U , Ordinance 33 is constitutionally valid.
» «
determination primarily.
DATED this

da, of August, 1982.
D¥ THE COURT:

Honorable- Kenneth Rigtrup

•-„ AMENDED ORDER to:
copy ot the- foregoing AMENDS*.
STZPHEH HOMER
1850. West 7800 South

w . » t Jordan City, "tan
on t h i s

day of August. 1 9 " -
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EXHIBIT C

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
April 6,

1987

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Robert J. DeBry
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84107

John Call and Clark
Jenkins,
Plaintiffs and
v.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Appellants
No. 870098

Honorable Dauid B. Oee and
Any Successory Judges of the
Third District Court,
Defendants and Respondents.

THIS DAY, Petition for Writ of Mandamus is grahted and mrit
shall issue.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
JOHN CALL and CLARK
JENKINS,

,

PlaintiffsAppellants,

|
>
]1

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS

vs.
HONORABLE DAVID B. DEE
and ANY SUCCESSOR JUDGES
]!
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
DefendantsRespondents.

SI0011

case No.

]

FACTS

Plaintiffs are real estate developers.
subdivided property in the City of West Jordan.

Plaintiffs
West Jordan

imposed a 7% fee as a condition for approval of the subdivision.

Plaintiffs challenged the 7% on constitutional and

other other grounds.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case has been before this Court on -three
prior occasions:
(Uz.

Call v. Ciry of vest Jordan, 6C6 P.2d 217

1S79) {Call I); C-ll v. City of West Jcrdan, €14 P.2d

FILE

copy

1257 (Ut. 1980) (Call II); and, Call v, City of West Jordan,
727 P.2d 180 (Ut. 1986) (Call III).
In the final pretrial skirmishing (prior to Call
III)/ Judge Rigtrup
evidence.

9

reversed the normal burden of producing

(Exhibit B.)

Specifically, the court ruled:

The trial is hereby bifurcated into two
phases. At the first phase, defendant
shall have the burden of producing
evidence on the following issues:
* * * *

Whether Section 9-6-8(2) of West Jordan
City Ordinance 33 was prepared by the
Planning and Zoning Commission, and
whether a public hearing was held prior
to promulgating the ordinance.
(Exhibit B at paragraphs 1 and 2(d).)
This Court approved of that ruling:
As mentioned above, the pretrial order
placed upon West Jordan the burden of
making a prima facie showing that it has
satisfied the requirements of Section
10-9-25. We hold as a matter of law
that it failed to carry this burden.
727 P.2d at 182.
Thereafter,
Rehearing

West

in this Court.

Jordan

^iled

a

Petition

for

The petition argues, in part,

that:
The testimony presented by the defendant
concerning the public hearing was merely
in compliance with the Court's pretrial
order.
That evidence was not neces-

Eventually, Judge Dee presided at the trial.
This was imposed as a discovery sanction.

2

sarily a complete presentation of the
defendantf s case. . .the City should
have the opportunity to make a complete
showing of the public hearing. (Emphasis from original.)
The petition for rehearing was denied and the case
was remitted to the Third Judicial District Court.
In the Third Judicial District Court, West Jordan
filed

a Motion

to

Allow

Amendment

to

Pleadings

and/or

Reopening of Case to Allow Presentation of Defendant's Case
in Chief.

(Exhibit C.)
the motion was supported by a memorandum.

it D.)

(Exhib-

In that memo, West Jordan again argues that:
The testimony presented by the defendant
concerning the public hearing was merely
in compliance with the Court's pretrial
order. That evidence was not necessarily a complete presentation of the
defendant's case.
* * * *

The City should have the opportunity to
make a complete showing as to the
holding of the public hearing. (Emphasis from original.)
On his last day on the bench, the motion was
granted by Judge Dee.

(Exhibit A.)

Specifically, Judge Dee

ruled that West Jordan could reopen its case-in-chief to
present some new evidence as to whether or not a public
hearing had been held.

3

?RGUMENT

The ruling by Judge Dee violates §78-7-19, U.C.A.
If an application for an order, made to
a judge of a court in which the action
or proceeding is pending, is refused in
whole or in part, . .no subsequent
application for the same order can be
made to any other judge, except to a
higher court, . •

In substance, West Jordan has persuaded Judge Dee
to overrule Judge Rigtrup.

Indeed, West Jordan has per-

suaded Judge Dee to overrule this Court!
completely frivolous.

The motion was

Judge Dee had no power and no dis-

cretion to act on that issue.

CONCLUSION

The write of mandamus should issue vacating Judge
Dee's recent order (Exhibit A ) , which reopened the trial.

DATED this Aj 4h day of

^^^(LkCT)

, 1987#

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM

IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF

MANDAMUS (Call, et al. v. Honorable David B. Dee, et al.),
was mailed, U.S., Mail, postage prepaid, this
Cl>cr}s t 1987, to the following:

Stephen G. Homer
West Jordan City Attorney
1850 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 84084

a!tLs

5

day of

EXHIBIT D

£tk,hiT 1
PETERSEN, SORENSEN & BROUGH
CtRTIflCO PUtUC ACCOUNTANTS
MCM8CRS OF
AMCRICAN INSTITUTE OF
CIRTlflLO * U 8 U t ACCOUNTANTS

44 lAtT 7300 SOUTH
r- •
MIOVALC. UTAH 14047
^ T n U f H O N f : (J01) 5665644

UTAH ASSOCIATION OF

September

11,

1981

CIRTIFICO PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Third Judicial r ; > : " M *\\.r:
Of S a l t Lake County
For The State Of Utah
RE:

OROER APPOINTING MASTERS, C i v i l No. C-78-829
JOHN CALL AND JOHN CLARK JENKINS - P l a n t i f f s '
vs.
CITY OF WEST JORDAN, UTAH - Defendant

Sir:

As the appointed master of the court in the above referenced proceeding!
I have completed a survey of the available accounting records at the City of
West Jordan.

In accordance with this order, the purpose of this survey was

to determine if the City's records could provide information as to: (1) the
amount of consideration paid by various Mibdividrrs rein tod tn thn City1*,
Flood Control and Park Fee Ordinance, (2) wh.it the city did with each fee
or land rncovcrpd from each subdivide?*, .ind (.1) (••.tin.ilc the ur-l uf extracting
this information from the City's records. This preliminary report presents
the results of my survey.

ACCOUNTING RECORDS AVAILABLE

For each of the fiscal years ending June 30, 1975 through 1978, the
following records were available:

(1) general ledgers, (2) cash receipt

journals, (3) cash disbursement journals. These lecgers and journals are the
complete records kept by the City and it appears that no records are missing.

APPENDIX "D"

Ouring fiscal year ending June 30, 19/y, m e u i ; ^ —
accounting system.

._

This system provides generally the same journals and ledgers

as the prior hand posted records; however, the Cit|y is missing cash receipt
journals from March 1979 through June 1979.

For the fiscal year 1980, all sirnilar

records are available.

ACCOUNTS USED FOR FLOOD CONTROL AND PARK FEES

The City has used a series of accounts within the general fund to account
for flood control and park fee transactions.

The following accounts were used

in fiscal years 1975 through 1978:
RECEIPTS
Flood Control Revenue
EXPENDITURES
Flood Control

Parks
Parks
Parks
Parks
Parks
Parks
Parks

-

Equipment and Operating Supplies
Buildings and Grounds
Sundry Charges
Land Purchases
Improvements Other Than Buildings
Equipment
Professional Services

For fiscal years 1979 and 1980 the following accounts were used:
RECEIPTS
Flood Control
EXPENDITURES
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood
Flood

Control
Control
Control
Control
Control
Control
Control
Control
Control
Control

•
-

Salaries
Benefits
Pub!ic Notices
Travel
Equipment and Supplies Maintenance
Professional Services
Miscellaneous Supplies
Miscellaneous Services
Land Acquisitions
Improvements Other Than Buildings

Generally, the same accounts were used year to year except in 1979 and
1980 the expenditure accounts were all under the general account t i t l e of
flood control rather than parks.

SURVEY WORK PERFORMED

With an understanding of the accounting records available and the accounts
used for the flood control transactions, I selected a few transactions for revie*.
back to supporting documentation. The transactions I reviewed and my findings
are presented below:

Receipts

1.

7/25/77 GENERAL LEDGER POSTING

$

28,141.89

This transaction was traced back to two cash receipt documents
as follows:
7/20/77
7/20/77

Clark Jenkins
Ensign Dev.

$

16,576.00
11,565.89

S

2B.14J,fl9

Wes Call
Bunker Hill

Cash receipt documents were found and I traced this amount to a
bank checking account deposit.

Expenditures

1.

5/11/77

CHECK NO. 3152

NE1LSEN, MAXWELL & WANGSGARD

$ 1,168,21

This payment was traced back to supporting invoices from Neil sen ,
Maxwell & Wangsgard.

The $1,168.21 is part of a total payment of

$19,215.20 and is supported by the following individual

invoices:

4/11/78
1.
2.
3.

West Jordan - Storm Drainage
Contract - Project Number 5860-63
Williamsburg Subdivision - area drainage study
Browns Meadow - area drainage study
Area #'s 5 and 6 - area drainage study
Cost Sunmary:
Engineer 18.0 hrs.

3/10/78
1.

$

375.0c

West Jordan - Storm Drainage
Contract 5860-63
Williamsburg Subdivision - area drainage study
Cost Summary:
Engineer 1.5 hrs.

4/11/78
1.

33.o;

Project Number 5878-53
Professional engineering services for construction
surveying and inspection for the 2700 West Storm
Drain Project
Cost Summary:
Project Inspection 28 hrs.
Surveyor
20 hrs.
Technician
2 hrs.
Travel
t 31.64

759.26
$

2.

5/18/78

CHECK NO. 3163

NOLAN & SON

1,168.21

S 10.000,00

This check is a partial payment on a total invoice of $19,644.61
related to installation of the 2700 West stonn drain.
3.

5/31/78

CHECK NO. 3260

NICK J . C0LLESS1DES

$ 472.00

The $472.00 is part of a total check for $1,172.00.

$472.00 was

traced to a supporting invoice related to legal services on the CALL
et, a l . vs. West Jordan case.

4.

11/22/76

CHECK NO. 0889 TONNESEN SPRINKLER COMPANY

$

11.150.C

$
$
$

4,765-C
6,385.C
1M50.:

This transactions was traced to a supporting invoice for
sprinkling systems as follows:
Harvest Estates No. 1
Dixie Valley No. 9

This payment is for 8 acres of ground at $10,000 per acre.
property purchase was 15.371 acres at 7000 South, 3200 West.

The total
A second

check for the balance of $73,710.00 was paid on the same date and was
charged to the Parks - Land Purchases account.

Conclusions

Wjth the understanding I gained from the sample tests above, I can
draw the following conclusions about the rest of the work the court has
requested:
Cash receipts are generally adequately documented, and I can determine
from the existing accounting records the individual contributions made
by each subdivider.
In order to determine the way the City has spent each individual subdivide
fees, I will need to perform the following steps:
Step 1
I will need to determine what each of the individual flood control and
parks disburesments were for.

From the sample tests above, I beleive

that the transactions are well documented and that I can determine the
purpose of each disbursement.
Steo 2
After I find a general description of the transaction provided in Step 1,
I will nged to determine who benefited from each individual

trpostctinn.

From the sample tests above, I know that often the accounting records do
not provide an explanation of the individual benefits to subdividers.
For example, from the accounting records, I have no way of knowing who
benefited from the $10,000 payment for the 2700 West storm drain.
determine the individual subdivider*s benefit from this type of

To

transaction, I will need the nelp of an engineer who is competent in
flood control systems and parks planning.

With engineering help, I

beleive that an allocation of these joint benefits can be made to
individual subdividers; however, various subjective decisions would
have to be made from the facts available on eacn transaction.

Also, $ UcK

an analysis would require a review of all related transactions in each
fiscal year,

I ao not beleive that a single subdivide^ c?n be ex&mngri

individual 1y.
Step 3
From Steps 1 and 2 I will have an understanding of what all the flood
control and parks transactions were for and who benefited from them.
Step 3 requires additional depth in the benefit analysis because the
City has spent money for flood control and parks that has come from
sources other than Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees.

These other

funds can come from Federal or State sources or from general tax revenues
For clarification in language, I will call these other funds "general
city funds" and I will call the Flood Control and Park Ordinance fees
"flood control fees'1.

The City has not segregated funds from these two

sources; therefore, the accounting records do not reflect which source of
money is being used when a disbursement is being made.

The problem at

this point is, then, that for some types of projects, it appears that the
City is responsible for providing a benefit to subdividers from general
City funds and that this benefit is not properly considered as part of the
benefit the City is responsible to provide individual subdividers for
their flood control fee.

(Note that Step 2 has given the subdividers crec

for the benefits from these general City funds.)
The objective of Step 3, then, is tn attempt to determine what (if ar
portion of a subdivider's total benefit (from Step 2) was provided from tt
City's general obligation and to subtract this benefit from the subdivider

total benefit.

This will lc3ve only the pure flood control benefit for

each subdivider.

To accomplish Step 3, I would have to determine if any

general City obligation for benefit to subdividers existed for each flood
control and park transaction and project. Since this information is not
provided in the existing accounting records, it will have to come from other
records and, again, from the help of a trained engineer.

It is also possible

that such information may not be available at all for some transactions,
therefore, the analysis would not be possible.
PROPERTY RECEIVED AS FEES
The City has on occasion received property as a fee from the Flood
Control and Parks Fee Ordinance.

These transactions are not recorded in

the accounting records of the City but are recorded in the minutes of the
City.
order.

I reviewed one of these transactions and found it to be in good
I did not, however, attempt to follow the transactions past the

entry in the minutes.

I should be able* to follow these transactions into

recorded deeds and perform procedures similar to those provided above.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNIFORM MUNICIPAL
FISCAL PROCEDURES ACT FOR UTAH CITIES

The court was somewhat confusing in it's instructions related to my
determination of West Jordan City's compliance with the Uniform Municipal
Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities (the Act). Paragraph 2 of the order
which stated "The master shall report to the court as to whether the documents
are being kept in accordance with Utah Fiscal Procedures Act and general
accounting principles" was striken from the work I was instructed to do.

However.

Paragraph 3 states that "If the documents are not being kept according to regular!
established accounting principles in accordance with the Fiscal Procedures Act,
the master shall also estimate the cost of the report had the records been prepare

according to generally accepted accounting principles arrd/or in compliance with
the Fiscal Procedures Act".

This paragraph requires me indirectly to determine

compliance in these two areas.

I feel that the Act is more applicable to this

situation than generally accepted accounting principles, therefore, I will
present only my opinions related to the ActFirst, Section 10-10-29 FUNDS TO BE ESTABLISHED of the Act states that
"Each City shall maintain, according to its own needs, some or all of the followi
funds or ledgers in its system of accounts:

(paragraph (9)) A ledger or group

of accounts in which to record the details relating to the general fixed assets
of the municipality."

West Jordan City did not maintain a property ledger

until recently, however, within the scope of this survey I could not determine
its accuracy related to prior transactions.
Second, Paragraph (2) of Section 10-10-29 also requires a City to maintain
"Special revenue funds, as required, such as a fund financed by a special-purpose
tax being earmarked for a specific purpose", and paragraph (4) requires

"...

capital improvement funds to otherwise account for funds allotted annually to
specific construction or improvement projects derived from sources other that the
proceeds of general obligation bond issues or general long-term debt."
Neither of these paragraphs are exactly related to the accounting problem
of flood control and parks fees, however, I think that they both provide guidance
on the proper method of recording these transactions.

First, while these fees

may not be taxes, ! think they are within the theme of paragraph (2) in that
they are for a special purpose and earmarked specifically for that purpose.
Secondly, these fees

were collected for flood control and parks construction or

improvement projects, therefore, paragraph (4) seems to apply.

The City has

recorded these transactions as year-to-year revenue and expenditures and has
not given them special accounting treatment.

With the guidance of paragraphs (2), (4) and (9) of Sections 10-10-29,
I conclude that the fees should have had special accounting treatment*

First,

I think the City should have prepared a fixed asset ledger that recorded a
description of all fixed assets purchased, date of purchase, cost and any other
applicable information.

This ledger should also have included the property

received as Flood Conrol and Parks Ordinance Fees.

Secondly, I think that the

Flood Control and Parks Fee receipts should have been recorded directly into a
restricted equity account within the general fund, which would represent earmark
funds for flood control and parks. As the City determined allowable uses for
these funds, they should have made a transfer from the restricted equity account
to a revenue account.

It appears that the expenditures have been recorded prope

This accounting method would have provided an equity account that reflected any
unused portion of these funds collected.

It would not however, require the City

to document the individual subdividers benefit from the expenditures or how his
individual funds were spent.

I cannot find any provision in the Act that requir

accounting records to be maintained so as to document an individual's benefit or
how an individual's funds were spent.
COSTS TO COrPlCTE THE EXAMINATION
I can objectively evaluate the time necessary to analyze the receipts from
subdividers and the general nature of the total disbursements by the City. I
have to use a very subjective analysis, however, in determining the time necessa
to allocate the benefits of all costs to individual subdividers and to determine
aay general obligation benefit that I refered to in Step 3 above.

For this reas

I must provide the following very broad range of fees to complete this work:

Analysis of fees received
and the general nature of the
disbursements (Step 1)

Minimum
Estimated
Fee

Maximum
Estimated
Fee

S

S

2,400

3,700

Step 2

5,000

7,600

Step 3

5,000

7,600

Total

S

12,400

$

18,900

FINAL REPORT
If the court should request me to complete this work, I will issue our
final report in accordance with Statement on Auditing Standards No. 35 Special Reports Applying Agreed Upon Procedures to Specified Elements,
Accounts or Items of a Financial Statement, issued by the Auditing Standards
Executive Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Because my procedures will not constitute a complete examination in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards, I will not express an opinion on
the financial statements of the City.

Also, if I was to perform additional

procedures or if I was to perform an audit in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, other matters might come to my attention that I would report
to the court.
Again, it is a subjective matter of determining how much the above fee
estimates would be if the records had been prepared in accordance with the
accounting methods I have suggested in my comments related to compliance with
the Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah Cities-

It would obviously be easier

to find recorded property received for fees, and any unused fees could easily
be identified in total.

These records would not help in the analysis of the

individual subdividers benefit from expenditures or in determining how his

individual fees were spent.

It appears reasonable that these records would hav

reduced the fees above by 10 to 20 percent. If the city would have kept indiv,
records for each subdivider on specifically how his n»ney was spent or how he
benefited fro. joint expenditures, then the above fees would have b

duced

substantially, but as I stated above. I cannot find a requirement that such recc
were necessary.
I will be happy to discuss these matters in detail at the courts request.

^^hn I. Brough, Partter
Petersen, Sorensen I Brough

